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Abstract: 
The period since September 11 attacks in 2001 has witnessed intense debates over to what 
extent a ―clash of civilizations‖ is inevitable. This paper argues that the ―clash of civilizations‖ 
thesis is a mistaken paradigm of understanding the Post-Cold War international order. While 
cultural and religious identities have increasingly become a source of political mobilization in 
the Post-Cold War world, the ―clash of civilizations‖ thesis wrongly presumes that the 
civilization identities can override other major driving forces of political mobilization, which 
includes nation-state, global capitalism, and global governance based on common liberal values. 
All of these forces run against and will constrain the possibility of a clash of civilizations. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there have been heated debates on the future of 
international order. The optimistic views argue that with the triumph of liberal democracy and 
market economy, the end of the Cold War has marked the end of history and the perpetual 
universal peace is eventually coming (Kant, 1970; Fukuyama, 1992). However, sharply 
contrasting these views, Huntington (1993a, b) provocatively argues that world peace is under 
severe threat of a ―clash of civilizations‖1, which will dominate global politics in the Post-Cold 
War world. According to his analysis, the Post-Cold War world is divided into seven or eight 
civilizations2, the fault lines between which will be the battle lines of the future. Huntington‘s 
claim has attracted a huge amount of attention and reaction. Notably, Ajami, Bartley, Liu, 
Kirkpatrick, and Mahbubani organized a collective attack against Huntington in the Foreign 
Affairs in 1993, which were followed by Tipson (1997), Holms (1997) and Said (2001).  
Aiming to evaluate how inevitable a ―clash of civilizations‖ is, this paper will develop a two-
part argument: First, the idea of a ―clash of civilizations‖ has captured an important aspect of 
the potential conflicts in the Post-Cold War world, i.e., cultural and religious identities have 
increasingly become a source of political mobilization. Second, however, the ―clash of 
civilization‖ in general is a mistaken paradigm in perceiving the Post-Cold War international 
order in the sense that it wrongly presumes that the civilization identities can override other 
major driving forces of political mobilization, which includes nation-state, global capitalism, 
and global governance based on common liberal values. All of these forces run against and will 
constrain the possibility of a clash of civilizations. Indeed, to what extent a clash of civilization 
is inevitable depends on the relative strength of different forces of political mobilization. 
Although cultural identity has become increasingly important as a source of political 
mobilization in the Post Cold War world, it cannot override the other major forces in the 
foreseeable future. Therefore, a world of clashes of civilizations remains improbable. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section two will examine the insights of 
Huntington‘s idea on the clash of civilizations. It is argued that cultural and religion identities 
have revived as an important source of political mobilization in the Post-Cold War world. 
While conflicts caused by cultural and religion differences have indeed posed threats to world 
peace and should not be ignored, they have still been secondary in current world politics. 
Empirically, the clash of civilizations perspective in general is mistaken about the past, only 
selectively interpret the present and therefore cannot serve as a sound paradigm to perceive the 
                                                 
1
 In Huntington‘s definition, the clash of civilizations will occur at two levels: ―Adjacent groups along the fault 
lines between civilizations struggle, often violently, over control of territory and each other. At the macro-level, 
states from different civilizations compete for relative military and economic power, struggle over the control of 
international institutions and third parties, and competitively promote their particular and religious values.‖ 
(Huntington, 1993a) This paper focuses more on the macro level.  
2
 These include Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly 
African civilization (Huntington, 1993a). 
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evolving Post-Cold War international order in the future (Russet, Oneal and Cox, 2000). 
Section three will show that cultural and religious identity as a source of political mobilization 
is severely constrained by other major forces of political mobilization, including nation-state, 
global capitalism and global governance based on common liberal values. A clash of 
civilization is far from being compatible with the maintenance and development of these forces. 
Section four will examine the general arguments in the context of China‘s case. It will be 
shown that despite potential threats of cultural and religious conflicts in China, political 
mobilization solely based on cultural and religious identities has largely been marginalized with 
little political significance. Section five will conclude the major findings. 
2. IDENTITY, CONFLICTS, AND POLITICAL MOBILIZATION: THE 
CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AS A NEW PARADIGM OF 
UNDERSTANDING WORLD POLITICS? 
As Russet, Oneal and Cox (2000) has pointed out, Huntington‘s idea that cultural differences 
produce conflict has its theoretical roots in social psychology. The distinction between the in-
group members and the outsider are considered as fundamental in the sense that in-group 
cohesion is largely attained by nurturing conflict with outsiders. Consequently, the boundaries 
of identity become the field of conflicts. As Shaw and Wang (1988: 207) has argued: 
―Humanity's propensity for war is the outcome of thousands of years of evolution during which 
cognition and intolerance of out-group members have been shaped by priorities of gene-culture 
co-evolution‖. 'The sociological thought of this line can be traced back to Simmel (1898), with 
important expansion of Coser (1956)3. Group identities have different sources and can be 
defined in many different ways. There are tribe, race, ideology, class, nation, state, religion, 
culture and as Huntington has emphasized, civilization identity among others. What is peculiar 
about Huntington‘s thesis is that he insists that civilization identity is the most important group 
identity in the Post-Cold War world and ―the clash of civilizations‖ should be considered as the 
new central paradigm of understanding world politics in the new era (Huntington, 1993b).  
The insight of Huntington‘s thesis lies in that ―clash of civilizations‖ has captured an important 
aspect of potential conflicts in the Post-Cold War world, i.e., cultural and religious identity has 
revived as an important source of political mobilization. During the period of the Cold War, 
countries were divided almost entirely in ideological terms. Ideological identity, i.e., 
communism versus liberal democracy, was the dominant source of conflicts and political 
mobilization. Other forms of group identities and conflicts were covered by the ideological 
division. However, since the end of the Cold War, cultural and religious identities have played 
an increasingly important role in mobilizing political actions. Religious fundamentalism has 
proliferated in many part of the world. As Huntington (1993, b) has documented, India‘s case is 
an illustrative example. While Nehru‘s vision of building a secular, socialist state with 
                                                 
3
 This approach has been widely applied in international relations theory and research as a part of the so-called 
―Constructionism‖ which has resulted in intense debates and controversies. (Levy ,1989; Heldt, 1997) 
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parliamentary democracy dominated India‘s political agenda during the Cold War era, the Post-
Cold War India has been increasingly affected by Hindu fundamentalism. According to New 
York Times (Huntington, 1993a), a growing Hindu rage toward India‘s Muslim has been 
spreading among the middle class Hindus. The most striking example of political mobilization 
based on the cultural and religious identity is the increasing influence of transnational religious 
organizations such as Al Qaeda. Termed as terrorists, these organizations have gradually 
mobilized considerable grass-root political support based on cultural and religious identities 
and indeed posed threats to world peace. 
Admitting Huntington‘s insights in the above sense, it is nonetheless questionable that 
Huntington‘s general thesis on the clash of civilizations can hold. While the cultural and 
religious identities have revived as a source of political mobilization, the phenomena should not 
be exaggerated. There is no compelling evidence supporting that the conflicts inflicted by 
cultural and religious differences have overridden other forces of political mobilization. Indeed, 
a close look at Huntington‘s list of examples of civilization conflicts will immediately show 
that many so-call civilization conflicts were caused by factors other than cultural and religious 
division. For example, Huntington repeatedly refers to Bosnia as a perfect illustration of 
civilization conflict, since Bosnia is located astride the "fault lines" of three of the civilizations 
he defines: Western, Islamic, and Eastern Orthodox (Matlock, 1999). However, close 
examination shows that Bosnia has been highly secularized and religion only play a secondary 
sole in domestic politics. The violent struggle is more about political power and historical 
hatred against exploitation by unscrupulous politicians. More importantly, while the violent 
struggle broke out in 1992, there was no so-called civilizational coalition emerging. In 
Huntington‘s terms, Germany and many of its European allies had civilization ties to Croatia, 
Russia to Serbia, and Turkey and Islamic states to the Bosnian Muslims. However, while Serbs 
fought against Croats and both Serbs and Croats against Muslims, no escalation of conflicts 
happened at all (Matlock, 1999). Most counties simply treated Bosnia irrelevant to their core 
national interests and took no actions. While this did not mean that there was no political 
mobilization based on cultural and religious identities in those ―kin-counties‖ in relation to 
Bosnia, it nonetheless shows that the politics of civilizations was only secondary.  
Huntington (1993, b) insists that the clash of civilizations should be considered as the main 
paradigm of understanding the Post-Cold War world order. However, there is increasing 
empirical studies showing that the clash of civilizations perspective in general is more 
misleading than illustrative. Henderson (1997, 1998) finds only a modest role for cultural 
differences in explaining conflict during 1950-1989. Gurr (1994) shows that among the 50 most 
serious political conflicts during 1993-1994, only 18 conflicts fell across Huntington's 
civilization division. Gurr's (2000) finds that what many imagine to be a recent increase in 
ethno-national wars worldwide actually began in the 1960s and dropped considerably in the 
mid-1990s from its peak a few years earlier (Russet, Oneal and Cox, 2000). More recently, 
Tusicisny (2004) concludes that the relationship between civilization difference and duration of 
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conflict is not statistically significant. Contradicting Huntington‘s hypothesis, he finds that the 
frequency of conflict between the Islamic and Confucian civilizations and the West remains 
marginal among all conflicts. Based on these empirical studies, it is reasonable to question 
whether the clash of civilization perspective can serve as a sound paradigm to understand the 
conflicts in the Post-Cold War world. However, as Huntington‘s thesis is more about 
anticipating the future, empirical studies about the past data cannot entirely invalidate his claim. 
From a theoretical point of view, the following section will show that to what extent a clash of 
civilizations is inevitable in future world politics depends on the relative strength of different 
sources of political mobilization. Given the prevailing influence of nation-states, global 
capitalism and global governance based on common liberal values, far from being inevitable, a 
world of clashes of civilization is unlikely for a foreseeable future. 
3. CONSTRAINING FORCES OF A ―CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS‖: 
NATION-STATE, GLOBAL CAPITALISM, AND GLOBAL GOVERNACE 
BASED ON COMMON LIBERAL VALUES 
In a peculiar way, Huntington privileges broad loyalties to civilizations over more specific 
ideological, ethnic and other identities. He argues, ―The fundamental source of conflict in this 
new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among 
humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural...The clash of civilizations 
will dominate global politics‖ (Huntington, 1993a). This view presumes that the cultural and 
religion identities can override all the other group identities and serve as the major source of 
political mobilization. However, in reality, nation-states, global capitalism and global 
governance based on common liberal values are still the major sources of political mobilization 
in the Post-Cold War world. Although the three major forces are not entirely compatible with 
each other, they nonetheless share the same feature that they definitely run against a world of 
clashes of civilizations.  
3.1 Nation states as the basic fabric of world politics 
Obsessing about the nature of the Post-Cold War world order, Huntington claims in effect that 
civilization identities are more decisive than nationalism in accounting for sources of conflict 
(Russet, Oneal and Cox, 2000). Huntington also claims that civilization identity will become 
the major source of stateness in the sense that states will increasingly define their interests and 
threats in civilization terms, ally themselves with states with similar or common culture and are 
more often in conflict with countries of different culture (Huntington, 1996). However, in 
reality, national identity has been the major source of stateness. According to Breuilly (1993), 
national homogenization figured prominently in the rise of the modern state system. Since the 
absolutist period, states have largely been organized on a national basis. It is true that even in 
the most ethnically homogeneous societies there is not always a complete correspondence 
between state and nation, but this has not prevented national identity from being the major 
source of stateness.  Indeed, as nationalism is an ―imaged‖ community and can be flexibly 
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―invented‖ or adjusted within the framework of nation states (Hobsbawn and Ranger 1983; 
Anderson, 1991), nation states often take active roles to promote nationalism through emphasis 
on shared symbols and national identity (Breuilly, 1993). In world politics, national interests lie 
in the core of nation states‘ foreign policies. Compared to national interests, civilization identity 
seems strengthless. Taking the Islamic civilization as example, the Islamic world has long been 
considered as a civilization characterized by a legacy of weak state (Kurth, 1994), but even in 
this case, interests tied to particular states have repeatedly triumphed over Islamic or pan-Arab 
sentiments (Russet, Oneal and Cox, 2000).  
As national identities are critical for modern nation-states, there is clear inconsistency when 
Huntington simultaneously admits that national identities will be overridden by civilizational 
identities and that nation-states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs. Most 
existing nation states, including those powerful large ones, have been diverse in cultural and 
religious terms, with countries such as the United States becoming increasingly ethnically and 
racially complex. In Huntington‘s definition, civilization is a cultural entity with the religious  
identity at its heart. Taking it as the major source of stateness will inevitably require dissolving 
the unification and sovereignty of most current nation states. As a major source of political 
mobilization, modern nation-states have endeavored to confine domestic cultural and religious 
conflicts, preventing them from eroding their unification and sovereignty. While Huntington 
admits that nation states will remain the basic fabric of world politics, he in effect negates the 
likelihood of a world of clashes of civilizations. What he has proposed as ―core states‖ of 
civilizations are just fictions in the sense that before these core states such as China, Russia and 
the United States become purified in civilization terms and fight against each other, they would 
have been dissolved onto the ash heap of history. 
3.2 Taming the passions: the expansion of global capitalism 
Another crucial flaw of Huntington‘s thesis is that he has largely overlooked the expansion of 
global capitalism and its implications for world politics. He refers to the development of global 
market economy as a source of the naïve belief on ―universal civilization‖, which is based on 
the wrong idea that modernization necessarily implies westernization (Huntington, 1996). 
While modernization may not mean westernization in Huntington‘s simple ―modernization 
versus westernization‖ framework, the expansion of global capitalism has nonetheless imposed 
huge influence on world politics. Indeed, it is an inherent requirement of global capitalism that 
the cultural and religious differences should be marginalized and political mobilization based 
solely on cultural and religious identities should be discouraged. As Hirschman (1977) has 
persuasively pointed out, Capitalism has performed political functions since the very beginning 
of its expansion, i.e., the spread of commerce and market economy in general are supposed to 
effectively call upon ―interests‖ to counteract the passions of aggression which are often based 
on cultural and religious identities. This function has provided strong political arguments for 
capitalism even before its triumph. As Montesquieu affirms, ―The natural effect of commerce is 
to lead to peace. Two nations that trade together become mutually dependent.‖ (Hirshman, 
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1977: 80) The so-called ―Golden Arches Theorem‖ has vividly illustrated the modern version 
of this view, i.e., no two countries both have McDonald‘s franchises have ever fought a war 
(Evans, 1997). Indeed, with the explosive growth of multinational firms and international 
business since the end of the Cold War, an increasing amount of people have been employed by 
the international firms. They have less and less attachment to a particular country or civilization. 
Rather, they share a common global capitalism culture (Nolan, 2008). These forces have posed 
tight constraints on potential mobilization solely based on civilization identities. 
Indeed, the expansion of global capitalism has been and will continue to be a tamer of cultural 
and religious conflicts. It is required by global capitalism that societies should be increasingly 
homogenous at least in the spheres related to economic transactions and political mobilization 
based on cultural and religious identities should be marginalized. While cultural and religious 
conflicts certainly cannot be entirely eliminated by the global commerce and market economy, 
a clash of civilizations is high improbable given the sweeping influence of global capitalism.  
3.3 Improving global governance based on common liberal values 
Huntington sharply criticizes the idea that the end of the Cold War meant the end of significant 
conflict in global politics and the emergence of one relatively harmonious world (Huntington, 
1996). According to him, this vision is an illusion, far too divorced from the reality. He is only 
half-right. It is true that liberal democracy has not universally triumphed and history is far from 
being ended since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but it is also difficult to deny that 
improving rather than overthrowing the US-led global governance based on common liberal 
values has been the mainstream political force in Post-Cold War world. States from different 
civilizations can peacefully co-exist within the global governance structure. 
Global governance based on common liberal value originated from the liberal international 
order under the US leadership. After World War Two, the US led the creation of universal 
institutions that ―not only invited membership but also brought democracies and market 
societies closer together‖ (Ikenberry, 2008). Under the US leadership, these universal 
institutions built a liberal international order that facilitated the participation and integration of 
both established great powers, and newly independent states. This structure has also properly 
functioned after the end of the Cold War in absorbing previously socialist countries. Most of 
these new comers have accepted important liberal values and has been keen to further 
transform themselves in order to be more compatible with this order (Ikenberry, 2006, 2008). 
Within this structure, people have increasingly identified liberal democratic values as the 
political ideal in the Post-Cold War world, be they belong to Confucian civilization or Islamic 
civilization. Although the current global governance structure is far from being perfect, the 
identity of liberal democratic polity has become a dominant source of political mobilization at a 
global scale. There is no compelling evidence showing that the cultural and religious difference 
can replace the common commitment of improving global governance based on liberal values 
(Raskin, et al., 2002; Rajan, 2006).  
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To summarize, to what extent a clash of civilizations is inevitable depends on the relative 
strength of different forces of political mobilization. Compared to the major forces such as 
nationalism, global capitalism, and universal liberalism, political mobilization solely based on 
the cultural and religion identities remains marginal on the stage of world politics. Indeed, 
systematically embodied into institutions such as nation-states, global market system, and core 
international organizations, all major sources of political mobilization in the Post-Cold War 
world politics run against a clash of civilizations 4 . Far from being inevitable, it seems 
improbable that clashes of civilizations will take over the world. 
4. MARGINALIZE THE POLITICS OF CIVILIZATIONS: THE CASE OF 
CHINA 
In Huntington‘s imagination, a Confucian-Islamic connection has emerged to challenge western 
interests, values and powers. As the core state of so-called Confucian or Sinic civilization, 
China will increasingly define its state interests in Confucian civilization terms and challenge 
Western civilization (Huntington, 1996). However, a close look at China‘s case will 
immediately show that Huntington‘s perception is wrong.  
The influence of Confucianism is limited in modern China. For a long time after the beginning 
of the 20th century, Confucianism was regarded in China as a negative force and as an obstacle 
to national development. The New Cultural Movement and the May Fourth Movement in the 
1910s initiated scathing criticisms against Confucianism. After that, Chinese elites increasingly 
viewed anti-Confucianism and rebellions against Chinese traditional culture in general as 
indispensable to promote China‘s modernization (Zheng, 1999). Soon after the Chinese 
Communist Party (the CCP) seized the power in 1949, the new regime launched ferocious 
attack against Confucianism. For Mao Zedong and many other leaders, Confucianism was the 
superstructure of feudalism and needed to be ruthlessly eliminated. With several generations of 
Chinese people being educated under the belief that Confucianism is generally a backward 
ideology, it can be said that the version of Confucian China has already ceased to exist.  
Huntington (1996) has emphasized the significance of so-called ―Confucian Renaissance‖ in 
the early 1990s. It is true that there is growing self-confidence emerging in China on traditional 
Confucianism culture during this period. However, these phenomena should mainly be 
interpreted as restoration of basic respect on Chinese cultural tradition. Huntington (1996) 
obviously has exaggerated the significance of these phenomena and mistakenly understood 
them as signs of a clash of civilization between China and the West. Indeed, contrary to 
Huntington‘s imagination, Chinese governance so far has never openly claimed Confucianism 
as the major source of national identity, let alone to define national interest and design foreign 
                                                 
4
 Huntington (1993, a) imagines that political mobilization based on the civilization identities will take over the 
major institutions such nation-states and the international organizations. However, as these institutions are 
manifestations of identities and principles different from cultural and religious identities, they would have been 
dissolved if civilization identities really rein. 
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policy in Confucianism terms. In fact, among those active proponents of the ―Confucianism 
Renaissance‖, most influential ones are oversea Chinese5.  
In terms of culture and religion, China has been a diverse country throughout its history. 
Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism have co-existed with each other for around one thousand 
years, most of the time peacefully. Muslim and Christianity have also prospered in China 
during more recent centuries. For example, recent years have witnessed an explosive growing 
of Christianity influence in China. According to the Economist, a conservative estimate shows 
that by 2008, there have been around 70 million Christians in Mainland China, almost 
equivalent to the total number of members of the Chinese Communist Party (74 million). A 
radical estimate even shows that there have been already 130 million Christian in Mainland 
China by 2008 (Economist, Oct 2nd 2008). If the radical estimate is true, then around one tenth 
Chinese have become Christian. In that case, it is highly questionable whether China can still 
be regarded as a core state of Confucianism civilization in Huntington‘s terms. 
More importantly, no matter what the real balance of different cultural and religious identities 
is in contemporary China, they have only marginal influence in Chinese politics. Contrary to 
Huntington‘s perception, political mobilization based on cultural and religious identities has 
been entirely marginalized by other major sources of political mobilization in China, i.e., 
nation-state building, capitalism expansion, and participation into the global governance based 
on liberal values. First, national identity and patriotism have become the core identity of 
political actions in China since the end of the Cold War6. This was reinforced by the anti-US 
movement stimulated by the bombing by the US-led NATO forces of the Chinese Embassy in 
Bergrade. While it is hard to deny the xenophobic aspect of Chinese nationalism, it nonetheless 
has little to do with Confucianism identity. A crucial mistake that Huntington has made in 
China‘s case is that he has wrongly interpreted the relationship between Chinese nationalism 
and Confucianism identity. While Confucianism can certainly serve as an instrument of 
building nationalism and patriotism, Chinese government has nevertheless chosen to 
circumscribe this effect due to Chinese ethical and religious diversity. Indeed, Chinese 
government officials and intellectuals frequently call China a ―unified multinational‖ state 
because there are different nationalities within China (Zheng, 1999). Chinese government 
clearly understands that any narrow-defined nationalism will inevitably erode the state 
unification and sovereignty. As a result, Chinese has endeavored to build a broadly defined 
patriotism as official nationalism and use it as a major instrument of nation state building. 
                                                 
5
 Huntington (1996) repeatedly refers to Lee Kuan Yew as an example of increasing influence of Confucianism 
identity. However, Lee Kuan Yew is the previous Prime Minister of Singapore and can not represent the opinion 
of Chinese government. Indeed, he has long been hostile to the Chinese Communist Party and only changed his 
position in recent decades. 
6
 In the 1950s, China rejected nationalism as a ―bourgeois ideology‖ Under the influence of the Soviet Union. In 
accordance with the Marxism and Leninism doctrines, the CCP followed the principle of internationalism in 
dealing with international affairs. However, while China abandoned Maoism in the late 1970s, it soon found 
itself in a spiritual vacuum (Kang, 1994). Within this background, nationalism has become the dominant 
ideology as a response of the decline of the Maoism faith (Zheng, 1999). 
Journal of Cambridge Studies 
113 
Confucianism has only played a limited role in this process. Second, as economic 
developmentalism has increasingly become social consensus and political legitimacy in 
contemporary China, capitalism expansion is an important source of taming potential cultural 
and religious conflicts. While Huntington (1996) has noticed China‘s increasing economic 
power as a result of market reforms, he has overlooked the profound implications of capitalism 
expansion on Chinese politics. With the market reforms gradually deepening, more and more 
people have gained vested interests in the process of capitalism expansion. No matter what 
cultural and religious background they belong to, it is in their interests to maintain a relatively 
stable social environment. Indeed, in order to guarantee a safe environment for people to make 
money, political mobilization solely based on cultural and religious identities have been 
decisively marginalized. Third, in terms of the relationship between China and the West, China 
has clearly chosen to participate into rather than challenge the west-led liberal international 
order. China is already a permanent member of the UN Security Council, which gives China 
the same authority and advantages of ―great power exceptionalism‖ as other permanent 
members (Ikenberry, 2008). China has joined the WTO and in effect become the major player 
in the international trade system. The role of China has been increasing in the World Bank and 
the IMF as well. It seems that rather than initiating a clash of civilization against the west on 
behalf of Confucianism, China is purposively integrating into the west. As Zheng (2004) has 
rightly pointed out, the key feature of Chinese modernization is selective importation of 
Western civilization with innovation. Although modernization does not equal to westernization, 
for developing countries like China, selectively importing western values, institutions and 
integrating into western civilization in general are nonetheless at the heart of modernization. 
Compared to above forces of political mobilization, cultural and religious identities have 
remained strengthless in political influence. Wherever conflicts based on cultural and religious 
identities pose substantial threats to the dominant political agenda, they will be decisively 
suppressed7.  
To conclude, despite increasing influence of cultural and religious identities, the political 
agenda in China has been dominated by nation-state building, capitalism expansion, and 
participation into the global governance based on liberal values. The politics of civilizations in 
Huntington‘s terms has been decisively marginalized. In a foreseeable future, it seems 
impossible for China to define its national interests and to design its foreign policies in 
civilization terms. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Admitting Huntington‘s insights in capturing the increasing influence of cultural and religious 
identities in world politics, this paper nonetheless argues that the ―clash of civilization‖ in 
                                                 
7
 For example, while the cult ―Fa Lun Gong‖ launched a series of political attacks against the government in the 
1990s, the state soon took decisive actions to dissolve the whole ―Fa Lun Gong‖ organization. See Wang and 
Zheng (2000). 
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general is a mistaken paradigm in perceiving the Post-Cold War international order. In relation 
to China‘s case, this paper argues that to what extent a clash of civilization is inevitable 
depends on the relative strength of different forces of political mobilization. Although cultural 
and religious identities have become increasingly important as a source of political 
mobilization, it cannot override the other major forces for a foreseeable future, i.e., nation-state, 
global capitalism, and global governance based on common liberal values. Indeed, as major 
sources of political mobilization, nation-state, global capitalism, and global governance based 
on common liberal values all run against and will contain the possible happening of a clash of 
civilizations. First, most existing nation states, including those powerful large ones, have been 
culturally diverse. They have endeavored to contain domestic cultural conflicts and prevent a 
clash of civilizations, which would inevitably erode the unification, and sovereignty of existing 
nation-states. Second, the expansion of global capitalism requires that nations should be 
increasingly homogenous at least in the spheres related to economic transactions. The current 
expansion of market economy at a global scale is certainly reducing the passions of aggression 
based on differential cultural identity. Thirdly, although liberal democracy has not universally 
triumphed and history is far from being ended since the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is 
undeniable that improving rather than overthrowing the US-led global governance based on 
common liberal values has been the mainstream political force in Post-Cold War world. As 
these forces will still dominate world politics in the foreseeable future, a world of clashes of 
civilizations seems to be improbable. 
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